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In the past five years a new environmental awareness has re-
sulted in an explosion of environmental protection and control ac-
tivity. This activity is long overdue. Care must be taken, however,
that "four centuries of well-developed standards of fairness, pro-
cedure and substantive law are not washed away with the intense
shower of exuberance and well meaning desires."' Good intentions
cannot justify ignoring established principles of law and reasonable-
ness. Even the alleged polluter is entitled to a defense.
The purpose of this comment is to survey and review defenses
available to a party who has been charged with a violation of Pennsyl-
vania's environmental protection laws and regulations. Since the
primary and most effective public nuisance and pollution control
litigants have been administrative agencies, 2 this comment will be
limited to defenses to orders and actions taken by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (DER).' In this respect
1. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
447, 279 A.2d 388, 392 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). Similarly, in North Am. Coal Corp. v.
Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 479-80, 279 A.2d 356, 362
(1971), the court stated,
Regardless of the urgency, or importance, or the volume of the clamor for
environmental purity, this Court cannot ignore well defined and long settled
principles of law which protect all of our citizens. If the regulatory agen-
cies are to carry out the full legislative intent of their respective enabling
statutes, then they must do so under the well recognized procedural due
process guarantees, rights, duties and standards provided by law.
2. See Comment, Local Regulation of Air Pollution: The Allegheny County
Experience, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 612 (1973). The reason for the high degree of success
of administrative agencies stems from the fact that, as legislatively authorized and
supported bodies, they do not suffer from the monetary limitations of individuals in
prosecuting antipollution suits or from the standing problems of environmental
groups. In addition, government agencies have the resources to build effective tech-
nical staffs and enforcement units whose sole purpose is to carry out the environmen-
tal policy of the state.
3. This agency, charged with the responsibility of protecting the Common-
wealth's environment, was created by the Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834, No.
275, §§ 1-2, which amended the Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929,
P.L. 177, No. 175 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 61-62 (Supp. 1975) ). The
Department shall hereinafter be referred to as DER.
a brief description of the organization, responsibilities, and powers of
DER is necessary.4
II. Environmental Protection in Pennsylvania-The Roles of
DER and the Courts
The Commonwealth's ability to protect the environment is based
on a framework of statutes, regulations, and license and permit pro-
visions dealing with the problems of air, water, and solid waste
pollution.5 Prior to 1970 environmental responsibilities were shared
by various state agencies, departments, and hearing boards,' but on
December 3, 1970, Pennsylvania's Administrative Code7 was amended
and DER8 was created. Various departments, boards, and commis-
sions were abolished and their functions transferred to DER.9 In
4. For a more detailed analysis of DER, its organization, and functions, see
Farley, The Department of Environmental Resources, 42 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 433 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Farley, DER].
5. See Speaker & Eichbaum, Pennsylvania's Environmental Strike Force, 42
PA. B. Ass'N Q. 477 (1971).
6. For example, the Department of Health had prime responsibility with re-
spect to: Land & Water Conservation & Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, §§ 5101-21 (Supp. 1970); Clean Streams Law, id. tit. 35, §H 691.1-.801
(1964); sewage treatment facilities, id. §§ 701-03; Sewage Facilities Act, id. §§ 750.1-
.15 (Supp. 1970); Air Pollution Control Act, id. §H 4001-15, and others. The
Department of Mines and Mineral Industries was responsible for administration of
the Anthracite Coal Mine Act, id. tit. 52, §§ 70-101 to -1405 (1966), and the Bitu-
minous Coal Mine Act, id. §H 701-101 to -706. The Department of Forests and
Waters was responsible for enforcement of numerous conservation statutes.
7. Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, No. 175
(compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §H 51-732 (1962) ).
8. Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834, No. 275, H9 1-2 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, §§ 61-62 (Supp. 1975) ).
The powers and duties of DER, as outlined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 510-
1 to -24 (Supp. 1975), include the enforcement of numerous antipollution and envi-
ronmental restoration statutes. In the former category are the Clean Streams Law,
id. tit. 35, H§ 691.1-.1001 (transferred to DER, id. tit. 71, § 510-1 (20)), the Air
Pollution Control Act, id. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (transferred to DER, id. tit. 71, § 510-1
(23)), and the Solid Waste Management Act, id. tit. 35, §§ 6001-17 (transferred
to DER, id. tit. 71, § 510-1(15)). In the latter class are the Land & Water Conser-
vation & Reclamation Act, id. tit. 32, §§ 5101-21, and mining land restoration and
reclamation statutes, id. tit. 52, §§ 681.1-.22 (1966) (Anthracite Strip Mining Law);
id. H§ 1396.1-.21 (open pit mining reclamation).
DER also administers various land use regulatory acts, such as those involving
regulation of radioactive material burial, id. tit. 35, §H 958.1-.5 (1964), and the ac-
quisition of land for radioactive material disposal, id. § 959.1. In addition, it is re-
sponsible for regulation of water supply and sewage disposal operations. Id. tit. 35,
H§ 711-15 (1964) (water works and water supply); id. §§ 750.1-.20 (Supp. 1975)
(Sewage Facilities Act); id. tit. 63, §§ 1001-1015 (Sewage Treatment Plant and Wa-
terworks Operators Certification Act).
9. See Farley, DER, supra note 4, at 444-45, for a comprehensive listing of
the departments and commissions abolished in the administrative agency reorganiza-
tion. These include the Air Pollution Commission, Anthracite Mine Inspectors,
Anthracite Mine Inspectors Examining Board, Coal Research Board, Flood Control
Commission, Department of Forests and Waters, Geographic Board, Land Reclama-
tion Board, Land Restoration Board, Department of Mines and Mineral Industries,
Mine Inspectors Examining Board for Bituminous Coal Mines, Oil and Gas Conser-




addition, the environmental responsibilities of other departments and
boards were transferred to DER. 10 The reorganization created sev-
eral departments to perform various functions within DER, includ-
ing the Environmental Quality Board (EQB), 11 the Environmental
Hearing Board (EHB), 1 2 and the Citizens Advisory Council."
The function of the EQB is to prepare the Commonwealth's
overall environmental plans, establish pollution standards and regu-
lations, review DER activities, and act as the policy advisor to DER. 4
The EHB is the adjudicating body within DER. Its function is to
hold hearings and issue rulings on DER actions and orders. 5 The
Citizens Advisory Council is the liaison between DER and the legis-
lature and public. Its function is to review environmental laws and
report to the executive and legislative branches, suggesting new laws
or necessary modifications of existing ones.' 6
DER has the power to establish pollution standards and regu-
lations17 and to enforce those standards and the various statutes for
State Forest Commission, State Park and Harbor Commission of Erie, Water and
Power Resources Board, and the Water Supply Commission.
10. See Farley, DER, supra note 4, at "Exhibit 'B'," part I.d.(i)-(xv), for a list-
ing of Department of Health functions that were transferred to DER and part I.e.(i)-
(ii) for a listing of those functions transferred from the Department of Labor and
Industry. Other agencies were transferred in their entirety to DER, including the
State Board for Certification of Sewage Treatment and Waterworks Operators, the
State Soil and Water Conservation Commission, and the Topographical and Geologic
Survey Bureau.
11. Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834, No. 275, § 2 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 62 (Supp. 1975)) [hereinafter referred to as EQB]. This Act provides
for appointment of EQB members. Id. § 180-1.
12. Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834, No. 275, § 2 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 62 (Supp. 1975)) [hereinafter referred to as EHB]. This Act provides
for appointment of EHB members. Id. § 180-2.
13. Act of December 3, 1970, P.L. 834, No. 275, § 3 (compiled at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 63 (Supp. 1975) ). This Act provides for appointment of Council
members. Id. § 158(p).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-20 (Supp. 1975) delineates the powers and
duties of the EQB.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-21 (Supp. 1975) delineates the powers and
duties of EHB. EHB's powers are limited to providing a forum for hearing ap-
peals from DER orders and determining the facts behind and merits of such orders.
EHB has no enforcement function. DER v. Anthony, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 626
(EHB 1973). Nor may it issue orders or require the joining of third parties at its
hearings. In re National Wood Preservers, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 78 (EHB 1974). As
to its adjudicatory powers, EHB may not rule on the constitutionality of statutes,
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 190 A.2d 111 (1963), but
as to DER regulations, it may. St. Joe Mineral Corp. v. Goddard, 14 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 624, 324 A.2d 800 (1974).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-22 (Supp. 1975) delineates the powers and
duties of the Council.
17. This power is conferred on the EQB and on other branches of DER pursu-
ant to statutes that the agency must enforce and administer. Id. § 510-20.
which it is responsible by means of administrative orders,"' licens-
ing and permit procedures, 9 and actions in equity for mandamus,
injunctions, and contempt orders.2" Virtually all existent environ-
mental control powers in the state reside exclusively in DER.2 The
agency's power is not unlimited, however, since its actions are ulti-
mately subject to review by courts.
Originally jurisdiction over all appeals from administrative
agency actions was vested in the court of common pleas of Dauphin
County.22 This responsibility, however, was transferred to the newly
created commonwealth court 23 by the Commonwealth Court Act.24
The commonwealth court has primary responsibility for environ-
mental cases, 25 including exclusive jurisdiction in appeals from DER
actions, 26 as well as original jurisdiction in any equity action brought
under the Clean Streams Law27 or the Air Pollution Control Act 28
18. It has been held that, at least in some instances, it is necessary for DER
to issue an abatement or other order to the alleged polluter prior to seeking an injunc-
tion. In Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871
(1974), the supreme court ruled that under the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAY.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1975), the Commonwealth could not seek
injunctive relief absent a prior administrative order to a coal mine owner asserting
the latter's violation and ordering abatement. The commonwealth court has held that
once a DER order has issued under the Clean Streams Law, a defendant is automat-
ically in contempt under § 691.210 of that statute if he does not appeal the order
and subsequently fails to comply. Commonwealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 619, 314 A.2d 868 (1973).
19. Enforcement may be accomplished by DER's conditioning its issuance of
the licenses and permits required by various statutes upon the applicant's compliance
with certain pollution regulations and standards or upon his construction of treatment
facilities.
20. The normal sequence is that DER will determine that a party is violating
a statute, regulation, pollution standard, or condition of its license, then issue an
order demanding compliance within a specified period of time. The party may ap-
peal this order to EHB and, pending the outcome of that appeal, to the common-
wealth court. If the DER order is affirmed and the alleged polluter fails to comply
within the specified period, DER will normally seek an injunction or mandamus com-
manding compliance when the statute under which the agency is acting so provides.
For example, the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1975)
and the Air Pollution Control Act, id. § 4011, authorize the Commonwealth to seek
injunctive relief. Finally, when an injunction has been issued, DER will seek a con-
tempt citation if the offending party violates the injunction. The steps taken by DER
in this respect depend on the remedies provided by the statute under which DER is
acting. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 619, 314
A.2d 868 (1973).
21. There are exceptions to DER's exclusivity in the areas of private and public
nuisance and in local and municipal air pollution control. Under these exceptions
private individuals, local district attorneys, and local pollution control boards are the
principal enforcers.
22. Act of April 7, 1870, P.L. 57, No. 36, § I (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 255 (1962) ).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.14(a), (d) (Supp. 1975).
24. Id. §§211.1-.15.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 211.401.
27. Id. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001.
28. Id. §§ 4001-15.
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when the Commonwealth is a party.29
A party's right to appeal a DER ruling to commonwealth court
is established by the Administrative Agency Law.A0 This right ac-
crues when a DER action adversely affects the interests of the party
involved.3 The right to appeal does not accrue from any preliminary
actions by DER, such as a DER letter to the party stating that the
latter's plan for abatement is unacceptable 32 or DER's notification
to the party of its violation of a statute or regulation without the
issuance of an abatement order.33 An appeal to commonwealth
court will be quashed when an appeal to EBB is pending, 4 but the
right to appeal accrues when EBB renders a decision.
The scope of the court's review on an appeal from an adminis-
trative agency is limited. In the words of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, a court may only determine
whether there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discre-
tion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or
functions. That the court might have a different opinion or
judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient
ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substi-
tuted for administrative discretion. 35
The court is not at liberty to pass on the credibility of witnesses
or the weight of the testimony in agency hearings since the agency
itself is the ultimate fact finder.36 Accordingly, the Administrative
Agency LawT7 provides that a court must affirm an agency's ad-
29. Apart from commonwealth court's exclusive and original jurisdiction in cer-
tain situations, see notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra, numerous statutes that
declare violations of their provisions to constitute public nuisances confer equity juris-
diction upon various common pleas courts in abatement actions. See Commonwealth
v. Glen Alden Corp., 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (Supp. 1975).
31. Standard Lime & Refractories Co. v. DER, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 434,
279 A.2d 383 (1971). This standard applies as well to a party's right of appeal to
EHB after a final order by DER.
32. Id. When DER's Office of Legal Counsel commences a legal action, how
ever, the adverse party's rights have been affected and it is entitled to a full hearing.
33. Sunbeam Coal Corp. v. DER, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 622, 304 A.2d 169
(1973). The court ruled, however, that a refusal by DER to renew a license or per-
mit is an appealable action affecting the rights of a party.
34. Standard Lime & Refractories Co. v. DER, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 434,
279 A.2d 383 (1971).
35. Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Auth., 379 Pa. 566, 573, 109 A.2d
331, 335, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 806 (1954).
36. Sanitary Water Bd. v. Mico Enter., Inc., 84 Dauph. 111 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962). See also DER v. Leon E.
Kocher Coal Co., 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 305 A.2d 784 (1973); North Am.
Coal Corp. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356
(1971).
judication unless it finds that the agency action is in violation
of the constitutional rights of the appellant or not in accordance with
the law or that a finding of fact by the agency necessary to its ad-
judication is not supported by substantial evidence.3" Thus, only
within this framework can an appellant formulate his defense to or
appeal from a DER order.
III. Defenses to DER/EHB Actions and Adjudications
A. Attacks on Statutes Under Which DER Acts
For purposes of classification, defenses to DER/EHB actions
and adjudications may be placed in two general categories: those
attacking the statutes under which DER acts and those attack-
ing the specific DER action itself. Attacks on the statutes under
which DER acts are primarily attacks on the statutes' constitutionality.
As such, an appellant faces an uphill battle because the Statutory
Construction Act 9 raises a presumption as to all statutes that the
legislature does not intend to violate the constitutions of the United
States or the Commonwealth. In applying this act, courts grant
all presumptions of reasonableness to statutes,40 generally finding that
the statutes favor the public interest and fulfill the legislative intent.
41
As a consequence the appellant carries a heavy burden when seek-
ing to reverse an agency's ruling on the ground that the authorizing
statute is unconstitutional. 42 A statute will not be declared unconsti-
tutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitu-
tion 43 so as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the court.
38. See notes 126-31 and accompanying text infra for a further discussion of
appellate review of an agency's action and definitions and standards for substantial
evidence.
39. The original Statutory Construction Act, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019,
No. 282, § 52, was repealed by the Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290,
and replaced by 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922, which contains substantially similar provisions
and presumptions.
40. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973),
quoting from Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962). The court de-
clared that debatable questions of reasonableness are to be resolved in favor of the
state. Accord, City of Philadelphia v. Watt, 162 Pa. Super. 433, 57 A.2d 591
(1948); Sobocinski v. City of Williamsport, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 425, 319 A.2d
697 (1974); Sanitary Water Bd. v. Tri-County Fuel Co., 79 Dauph. 128 (Pa. C.P.
1962).
41. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79
A.2d 439 (1951); Commonwealth v. B. Abrams & Sons, 93 Dauph. 305 (Pa. C.P.
1971).
42. City of Philadelphia v. DePuy, 431 Pa. 276, 244 A.2d 741 (1968); Penn-
sylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Stiely, 429 Pa. 614, 241 A.2d 74 (1968); L.J.W. Re-
alty Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 134 A.2d 878 (1957); Bortz Coal Co.
v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971), af!'d
sub nom., Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670
(1973).
43. In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of 1967 General Election, 431 Pa. 165,




1. Invalid Exercise of the Police Power.-A standard argu-
ment used in constitutional challenges is that the statute or regula-
tion constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. The police
power is that authority by which a state legislates for the public
good.4 4 It derives from the sovereignty of the state and has been
held to be one of the least limitable of governmental powers.4 5 Since
all environmental control legislation is related to the health and
welfare of the public, these statutes usually will be interpreted as
valid exercises of the police power.
To constitute a valid exercise of the police power, a statute
must meet three principal requirements." First, the end sought
must be one the law deems sufficient to justify protection. 7 Tra-
ditionally, public health, safety, morals, and welfare have been con-
sidered subjects that justify the exercise of the police power.48  In
fact, statutes promulgating public health and safety regulations are
presumed to involve a reasonable and constitutional exercise of that
power. 49 Second, the regulation involved must bear a reasonable re-
lation to the attainment of the end sought.5 ° In this respect, legisla-
tures are given wide latitude in determining what measures are rea-
sonably necessary for the public good.5 ' Third, the exercise of the
police power must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 2 In Goldblatt
v. Hempstead5 the United States Supreme Court held that a balanc-
ing test must be utilized to determine whether this requirement is met.
614, 618, 241 A.2d 74, 76-77 (1968); Milk Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652,
659, 198 A.2d 840, 843 (1964); Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 441, 448, 279 A.2d 388, 393 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal
Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973).
44. For a detailed discussion of the nature of the police power see Garton,
Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REV. 261 (1971).
45. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); District of Colum-
bia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
46. These requirements, promulgated by various decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, see notes 47-53 and accompanying text infra, have been applied
by Pennsylvania courts in determining the validity of police power statutes. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973); Gambone v.
Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954); Simco Sales Serv. v. Braokin,
344 Pa. 628,26 A.2d 323 (1942).
47. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
48. Id.
49. Simco Sales Serv. v. Brackin, 344 Pa. 628, 26 A.2d 323 (1942); City
of Philadelphia v. Watt, 162 Pa. Super. 433, 57 A.2d 591 (1948).
50. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
51. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1920).
52. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
53. Id.
The public benefit to be achieved must be weighed against the bur-
den placed upon the regulated party. When the former predominates,
the requirement of reasonableness is met. Although this test provides
some guidance to courts, its subjective nature detracts from its use-
fulness. 54  This third requirement has often been the basis for
attacking the validity of the exercise of the police power in the promul-
gation of environmental control regulations.
It is settled law that private property is subject to reasonable
limitation and regulation by the Commonwealth in the public in-
terest,55 but it is not clear when such limitation and regulation be-
comes unreasonable.5" When public health and safety demand,
extreme measures may be taken in the regulation of the use of prop-
erty.57  That an exercise of the police power will impose severe
hardship or heavy financial burdens on the regulated party is
not a bar to the exercise of that power. In Commonwealth v. Harmar
54. Recognizing that balancing values would be difficult and unpredictable, in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court promulgated a
standard under which the regulation might be deemed unreasonable when it goes so
far as to deprive a property owner of virtually all profitable use of his property,
thereby diminishing its value to practically nothing, i.e., when in effect the regulation
becomes a taking of property without compensation. This formulation has been
largely ignored, however, and was effectively disposed of in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962), when the Court held that, although a comparison of the regu-
lated party's property value before and after the regulation is certainly relevant, it
is not conclusive and the state should not be burdened with the duty to compensate
the regulated party when the purpose of an otherwise valid regulation is to protect
the public health and welfare.
55. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954); Sobocin-
ski v. City of Williamsport, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 425, 319 A.2d 697 (1974)
(weed ordinance); Harger v. DER, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482, 308 A.2d 171
(1973) (prohibition of strip mining on mine owner's own property within 300 feet
of an occupied dwelling house); Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v.
DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct., 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973); Sanitary Water Bd. v.
Tri-County Fuel Co., 79 Dauph. 128 (Pa. C.P. 1962); Commonwealth v. Pollard,
97 P.L.J. 133 (Pa. C.P. 1949) (air pollution restrictions on type of fuel a party may
sell or use).
56. Actual confiscation of property without payment has been held to be a
valid exercise of the police power when such action is necessary to protect the public.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). Because environmental legislation, particu-
larly that relating to pollution control, has as one of its primary purposes the protec-
tion of the public health, environmental legislation that results in a taking without
compensation appears to be constitutionally permissible.
57. E.g., Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). In that case, the Air Pollution Commission
sought an injunction to force Bortz to bring the emissions from its beehive coke ovens
within the Commission's standards. In fact, defendant could not operate within
those standards. An injunction requiring it to do so would effectively drive
Bortz and the beehive coke oven industry in the state out of business. The injunction
was eventually granted. Although Bortz did not attack the reasonableness of the
order or contend that it involved an invalid exercise of the police power, the court
spoke in terms of the police power when it stated that the use of property may be
regulated by the Commonwealth in the interest of public health and safety, even to
the extent of driving a party out of business.
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Coal Co.,58 for example, a mine operator was required to treat pol-
luted mine water being pumped from his mine, even though the
pollution was not caused by his operations.59
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.60 indicated, however,
58. 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973). The mine owner contended that the
Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1975), was an un-
constitutional exercise of the police power because it required the owner to treat acid
mine drainage that had come, not from its mines, but from adjacent mines no longer
in operation. The Sanitary Water Board, predecessor to DER in administering the
Clean Streams Law, had denied Harmar's application for a mine drainage permit to
discharge untreated mine water that had seeped into Harmar's mine from an adjacent
abandoned mine. The court of common pleas of Dauphin County reversed the
Board's order and the commonwealth court affirmed the reversal on grounds that the
Clean Streams Law could not be construed to constitutionally require Harmar to treat
mine water that Harmar had not caused to be polluted. The supreme court
reversed and reinstated the Board's order. After noting that the public has an
overriding interest in pure water and mine drainage pollution control under the En-
vironmental Rights Amendment to the state constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, the
court ruled that it is within the police power of the Commonwealth to suppress what
is offensive and unsanitary and to enact regulations to promote public health. The
court concluded that imposing the costs of pollution control on coal companies that
discharge wastes into the waters of the Commonwealth pursuant to a profit-making
enterprise does not constitute an undue burden or hardship on those companies and
does not render such an imposition an invalid exercise of the police power. The
court stated that the legislative intent to favor the public interest certainly would not
be served by requiring the public to bear the expense of abating pollution caused by
Harmar's profit-making, resource depleting venture. Id. at 101, 306 A.2d at 321.
59. See also Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948). In that case
a coal mine operator sought an injunction against enforcement of the Bituminous
Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.21
(1966), which, inter alia, required the mine operator to take certain measures to re-
claim and restore the surface land affected, once mining operations had ceased. The
court rejected the operator's contention that since it imposed a heavy financial
burden upon the landowner, the act constituted an invalid exercise of the police
power and held that the public benefit to be derived from this act outweighed any
financial burden on the mine operator. Id. at 316-17, 56 A.2d at 679.
60. 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974). In this case, DER sought an injunc-
tion requiring a mine operator to treat a discharge after discovering that drainage
from the defendant's abandoned mine was polluting the Susquehanna River. The suit
was based on three claims under the Clean Streams Law and one claim based on com-
mon-law public nuisance doctrine. The lower court denied a permanent injunction
after failing to find Barnes and Tucker liable on any of the four counts. The su-
preme court reversed on appeal. The court held that based on the facts in the case,
the 1965 version of the Clean Streams Law, Act of August 23, 1965, P.L. 372, No.
194, applied and that the defendant could not be held liable under that version. The
court, however, found that the discharge constituted a public nuisance and that
Barnes and Tucker could be required to abate on that ground. The court stated that
in the abstract abatement of water pollution by the Commonwealth is a reasonable
exercise of the police power, but in practice the exercise of that power must be re-
stricted by the parameters of reason. The court then remanded the case to the lower
court for a determination of the appropriate relief, stating that a ruling as to whether
the Commonwealth's exercise of the police power would be unduly oppressive to the
defendant and therefore invalid could not be made until the lower court order was
issued. Id. at 419-20, 319 A.2d at 886.
that there are limits to the burden that may be placed upon a private
party by the Commonwealth in the valid exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, these limits clearly may fluctuate. The court in
Barnes & Tucker emphasized reasonableness and the balancing of
burdens and benefits when defendant was not currently engaged in
a polluting activity, while these considerations were largely ignored
in Harmar when defendant was actively pumping mine waste into
public waters.
In summary, attacks on environmental legislation alleging
an invalid exercise of the police power have little chance of suc-
cess since environmental statutes provide precisely the type of pro-
tection to public health and welfare that the police power was
meant to afford. This is true even though the statute may seriously
impair a party's operations or drive him out of business. 1 On the
other hand, some relief may be available to a party who is not en-
gaged in an activity that violates an environmental statute, but never-
theless is ordered to abate pollution that he did not cause.
2. Taking Without Due Process or Compensation.-An argu-
ment similar to and often confused with the police power argument
is that a statute unconstitutionally allows the "taking" of property,
either by direct state action or by statutory regulation of an owner's
use of his property, without compensation. In evaluating this argu-
ment the purpose of the state action or regulation must be consid-
ered. When a regulation is necessary for and reasonably related to
protection of public health, safety, morals, and welfare, it is an exer-
cise of the police power" and no compensation to property owners
for expenses or losses incurred in complying with the regulation is
necessary. 6 When no direct or indirect relationship to protection of
the public is found, however, loss of use and expense incurred pursu-
ant to compliance with the state regulation may involve a "taking"
for which compensation is due.
61. But see notes 205-11 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of de-
veloping law concerning economic considerations in the area of environmental
law enforcement.
62. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
63. An adverse economic impact caused by a statute or regulation does not con-
stitute a taking without due process or compensation when the statute or regulation
bears a reasonable relation to the public health and welfare. See, e.g., Miller v.
Schoere, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of property in interest of public health is
valid exercise of police power); Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 418
Pa. 225, 210 A.2d 495 (1965) (minimum education regulation that deprives beauty
school of paying students is not a taking without due process); Dufour v. Maize, 358
Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948) (additional financial burden imposed by Bituminous
Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act is not a taking without due process); Bortz
Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388
(1971), af 'd sub nora. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 362, 299
A.2d 670 (1973) (regulation that would effectively drive defendant out of business
is not a "taking").
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It is doubtful that any environmental control or antipollution
statute will be successfully challenged by a "taking without compen-
sation" defense in light of Pennsylvania's Environmental Rights
Amendment, 4 which declares that all citizens of the Commonwealth
have a right to and an interest in a clean and healthful environment.
Courts have rejected this defense in challenges to the Air Pollution
Control Act, 5 the Clean Streams Law,66 and the Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act.67
Although the "taking without compensation" defense rarely pre-
vails, one court ruled that a "taking" occurs when DER's actions im-
pose burdens on a private party that should be borne by the state.
In Sanitary Water Board v. Glen Alden Corp.6s the Board had or-
dered a coal company to conduct pilot plant studies and other re-
search to develop a method of treating its acid mine drainage. At the
time of the order there was no effective treatment procedure. The
court found that the Commonwealth intended to use any successful
method developed by Glen Alden in treating mine drainage through-
out the state without payment. This conduct by the Commonwealth
was held to be a deprivation of property without due process or com-
pensation in violation of the federal and state constitutions.
69
64. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
65. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), aft'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973) (upholding PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15
(Supp. 1975)).
66. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871
(1974); Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973); San-
itary Water Bd. v. Tri-County Fuel Co., 79 Dauph. 128 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (upholding
various versions of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1975) ).
67. Harger v. DER, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482, 308 A.2d 171 (1973). The
court upheld PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.21 (1966), as a valid exercise
of the police power and denied a coal operator's petition to convene the State Min-
ing Commission to assess damages to be paid to the operator.
68. 83 Dauph. 108 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
69. On the other hand, in a case that bears close resemblance to a condemna-
tion proceeding, the superior court upheld a city ordinance promulgated by the
local board of health under a state statute authorizing the board to declare
as nuisances those conditions that are prejudicial to the public health. In City of
Philadelphia v. Watt, 162 Pa. Super. 433, 57 A.2d 591 (1948), the ordinance pro-
vided that private driveways that were improperly graded or defectively paved were
public nuisances and could be repaired or reconstructed by the city at the owner's
expense. Pursuant to the ordinance, the city, having given the defendant two days
to correct the defective condition of his driveway, repaved it and assessed the costs
to the defendant. The court ruled that the ordinance was not a taking without com-
pensation, but a valid exercise of the police power to protect the public since
the driveway was used by the public despite the fact that it was on the defendant's
private property.
The boundaries between governmental regulations that constitute
a valid exercise of the police power and those that involve a "taking"
requiring compensation are hazy. When a clear nexus between the
regulation and public health and well-being can be shown, how-
ever, an exercise of the police power is involved.7 0 On the other hand,
when furtherance of the public good is only incidental to the regula-
tion or when the regulation imposes burdens on a private party that
in all fairness should be borne by the state, 71 a "taking" may result.
3. Discriminatory or Class Legislation.-Many Pennsylvania
environmental control statutes have been attacked on the grounds that
they constitute special or class legislation or that they unconsti-
tutionally discriminate in their application against certain classes of
defendants. Courts have rejected these challenges because "[a] classi-
fication in and of itself is not prohibited by Article III, § 7 [of the
Pennsylvania Constitution] . . . as long as the classification is rea-
sonable and founded upon a genuine distinction .... ,,72 The sole
task of a reviewing court is to determine if the purported classifica-
tion bears a reasonable and logical relationship to the end sought by
the legislature.73 Thus, courts have been reluctant to declare environ-
mental protection statutes74 unconstitutionally discriminatory.
75
The Air Pollution Control Act has been attacked on the grounds
that its penalty provisionsTM  which exclude government bodies and
political subdivisions, constitute a violation of the equal protection
70. The required nexus between government action and public protection will
be found even though those members of the public being protected may be trespassers
on the regulated party's property. Id.
71. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
72. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 133, 179 A.2d 439, 442
(1962), quoted with approval in Chartiers Valley Jt. Schools v. Allegheny County
Bd. of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 539-40, 211 A.2d 487, 498 (1965).
73. Chartiers Valley Jt. Schools v. Allegheny County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965).
74. This is not to say that DER's conduct in administering and enforcing those
statutes may not, in certain instances, be discriminatory. But the existence of dis-
crimination in that area depends on the particular facts involved. For example, in
DER v. Conley, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 676 (EHB 1973), DER, purportedly acting under
the Clean Streams Law, revoked a landowner's permit to install a septic tank on his
land when he built his new house. At the same time, however, the Department per-
mitted a neighboring landowner, whose house was already built and occupied, to con-
tinue using his on-site sewage system. The EHB ruled that DER's action violated
equal protection requirements and ordered DER to restore the aggrieved landowner's
permit.
75. An exception is an 1894 decision by the supreme court in City of
Philadelphia v. Westminster Cemetery, 162 Pa. 105, 29 A. 349 (1894). This
case involved a statute making it unlawful to establish a cemetery on lands within
one mile of any first-class city when the drainage from such land passed into a
stream from which the city obtained its water supply. The court held the law to
be unconstitutional as local or special legislation since Philadelphia was the only
first-class city in the state.




clauses of the federal 7 and state 78 constitutions. Courts have rejected
this argument, however, holding that it is within the power of the
legislature to exclude government bodies from the penalty provisions
of an act without rendering the legislation discriminatory. 79
The Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act8° has
been upheld against similar attacks. In Dufour v. Maize8' a coal mine
operator contended that the Act unlawfully discriminated against
bituminous coal mining since at the time there was no similar legis-
lation applicable to anthracite coal or other types of mining. 2 The
court held that the Act was merely a legislative response to particular
problems attendant to bituminous coal strip mining, that the legis-
lature was not confronted with the same problems with respect to
anthracite coal and other types of mining, and that, as such, the
operator had neither shown that the Act was discriminatory nor over-
come the presumption of constitutionality.83
4. Illegal Delegation of Legislative Power Through Lack of
Legislative Guidelines to Agency.-Another line of attack is that the
legislature in delegating powers to an administrative agency failed
to provide adequate guidelines or impose sufficient limitations, there-
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
78. PA. CONST. art. I, § 32.
79. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973); Air Pollution Comm'n v. Coated Materials Co., 92
Dauph. 274 (Pa. C.P. 1970). The court in Bortz reasoned that it would make no
sense to attempt to penalize a government body by fines and imprisonment, that
cease-and-desist orders against a government entity should be sufficient, and that ex-
clusion of government bodies from the penalty provision of an act is not unlawful
discrimination.
80. Act of May 31, 1945, P.L 1198, No. 418 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, §§ 1396.1-.21 (1966) ).
81. 358 Pa. 309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
82. The Act was later amended to include all types of surface coal mining. See
Surface Mining Conservation & Reclamation Act, Act of November 30, 1971, P.L.
554, No. 147 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.21 (Supp. 1975) ).
83. The operator also attacked the statute's provision that fines and permit fees
should be used to establish a fund to support strip mine reclamation (a similar provi-
sion in the present act is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.18 (Supp. 1975)). The con-
tention was that the fund violated the state constitutional provision prohibiting special
appropriations for benevolent, charitable or educational organizations (PA. CONST.
art. III, § 29, formerly art. II, § 18). The court rejected this argument, holding
that environmental reclamation and restoration was not one of the "special" benevo-
lent, charitable or educational purposes with which the constitutional provision dealt.
This holding validates similar funds established by other environmental statutes for
similar restoration or antipollution use. See, e.g., the Clean Streams Law's establish-
ment of the Clean Water Fund, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.8 (Supp. 1975), to be
used for the elimination of water pollution within the state, and id. § 4009.2, setting
up the Clean Air Fund.
by illegally delegating legislative prerogatives. The requirement that
the legislature establish sufficient standards and limitations in dele-
gating power is a natural corollary to Article II, section 1 of the
Pennsylvania constitution, which provides that the legislature is the
sole lawmaking body.84 Problems arise when the legislature confers
broad discretionary powers upon an agency, as was done with most
environmental control legislation."5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has noted that the rule
against nondelegation does not require that all details of administra-
tion be precisely or separately enumerated in the statute in ques-
tion. 6 Rather, the legislature may establish basic standards and dele-
gate the duty to implement the declared policy in accordance with the
statute's general provisions.8 7 When determining the constitutionality
of a statute in which the legislature has delegated certain powers,
the court must consider the purpose, nature, and reasonable effect of
the statute.88 A statute is valid when its basic policy and purpose are
discernible and the area of agency discretion is clearly delineated. 9
Although the necessity for such delegation is generally under-
stood, litigants in environmental cases frequently argue that the legis-
lature has illegally delegated its powers. In Commonwealth v.
Haines?° DER sought an injunction to restrain defendant from violat-
ing the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act9' by operating a
landfill without a permit. Defendant demurred on the ground that
the Act illegally delegated power by giving DER the authority to
draft regulations and standards without legislative limitations and
guidelines.92 Citing Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny
County Board of School Directors,9" the court ruled that the legis-
84. Chartiers Valley Jt. Schools v. Allegheny County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965).
85. The legislature often delegates the entire responsibility for formulating en-
vironmental quality standards to the agency because it realizes that the establishment
of such standards involves an area of technical expertise commanded by the agency
and outside legislative competence.
86. Chartiers Valley t. Schools v. Allegheny County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965).
87. Id.; accord, Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277
(1947). ,
88. Chartiers Valley Jt. Schools v. Allegheny County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965).
89. Id. at 534, 211 A.2d at 495; Pennsylvania Water & Power Resources Bd.
v. Green Springs Co., 394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178 (1958).
90. 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 204 (C.P. York 1972).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6001-17 (Supp. 1975).
92. DER has the authority to
[a]dopt such rules, regulations, standards and procedures as shall be neces-
sary to conserve the air, water and land resources of the Commonwealth,
protect the public health, prevent public nuisances, and enable it to carry
out the purposes and provisions of this act.
Id. § 6006(3).
93. Case cited note 84 supra.
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lative policy and statutory purpose clearly established sufficient
standards to guide the agency, thereby refuting defendant's conten-
tion.
94
In Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Commission95 the Air Pollu-
tion Control Act96 was attacked as an illegal delegation of legislative
power because the Act permitted the air pollution control agency
to set air quality standards. The court disagreed, noting that the legis-
lature may confer upon an agency discretionary power to implement
legislative intent and that the legislature in this instance had clearly
defined "air pollution" and had adequately defined and limited the
Commission's powers.9 7 The court also noted that if the commission
established unreasonable standards, the public was nevertheless pro-
tected by the appeal provisions of the act, impliedly advocating a less
stringent test when adoption of administrative regulations may be ap-
pealed.
Thus, courts have held that a statute does not constitute an
illegal delegation of power merely because it confers upon DER the
power to establish environmental quality standards or allows DER
to use its own discretion in enforcing and administering the act. 98
There is no reason to believe that other environmental statutes will
be construed differently as long as the policy and legislative intent
of the statute are determinable and the outer limits of the agency's
discretionary power can be defined therefrom. Additionally, even
94. See also Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 77 Dauph. 264 (Pa.
C.P. 1961) (Clean Streams Law). Therein, the defendant contended that the provi-
sion of the Clean Streams Law prohibiting waste discharges into public waters when
the Sanitary Water Board deemed such discharge to be inimical to public health, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.202 (1964), was an unlawful delegation of power since the
Board was given discretion to determine what would be inimical to public health. The
court rejected this contention, holding that the legislature clothed the Board with the
authority to set standards and conditions in a technical and engineering area that is
beyond the expertise of the lawmakers themselves. The court ruled that the legis-
lature had clearly established the purpose and policy behind the statute and that its
delegation of the responsibility for the determination of what constitutes a "clean"
stream was not illegal. Accord, Sanitary Water Bd. v. Anthony, 66 Dauph. 250 (Pa.
C.P. 1954).
95. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971), af'd sub nom. Bortz
Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973).
96. PA. STAT. ANN.-tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (Supp. 1975).
97. Accord, Air Pollution Comm'n v. Coated Materials Co., 92 Dauph. 274
(Pa. C.P. 1970) (legislature may not delegate power to make a law, but may give
agency authority and discretion in executing statutory intent); Commonwealth v.
Prince Mfg. Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 69 (C.P. Carbon 1971).
98. The Solid Waste Management Act, the Clean Streams Law, and the Air
Pollution Control Act have all been upheld in this respect. See notes 90-97 and ac-
companying text supra.
these criteria may be relaxed when the statute allows an aggrieved
party to appeal the agency's discretionary act.9"
5. Vagueness.-A final basis for attacking environmental con-
trol statutes arises when the statute or regulations promulgated there-
under100 are not understandable or are too vague to provide reason-
able guidance to regulated parties. It obviously is unfair to prosecute
the regulated party for violation of a statute that fails to inform him
of precisely what he must do to comply therewith.
There is a paucity of cases in which defendants have attacked
environmental statutes for being too vague to be enforceable. The
few cases that have dealt with the matter considered whether the
statute or regulation was reasonably understandable and adequately
specific to put a reasonable man on notice of what he must do to
comply.' For instance, section 1.3 of Air Pollution Commis-
sion Regulation IV, 102 which established particulate emission stand-
ards for smoke discharges, was attacked as being too vague to pro-
vide reasonable guidance to the public. The commonwealth court
rejected this contention and held that the regulations were reasonably
understandable and sufficiently specific to be valid.'
99. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
100. Environmental quality standards promulgated by DER's EQB under various
laws that DER administers are codified in title 25 of the Pennsylvania Code. 25
PA. CODE.
101. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
456, 279 A.2d 388, 397 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973).
102. BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 491 (1970) (interim regulation).
103. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), a/f'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). Bortz challenged § 1.3 of regulation IV. Subsection
2 of § 1.3 is illustrative of the entire regulation. It provides,
(2) If any person causes, suffers, allows or permits particulate matter (in-
cluding smoke) to be emitted into the outdoor atmosphere from any
air contamination source such that the actual or calculated emission
rate of particulate matter from such source (as determined in accord-
ance with Section 1.5) may be expected to cause a ground level concen-
tration at any point outside the person's property in excess of either
150 micrograms of suspended particulate matter per cubic meter of air
or 0.6 milligrams of particle fall per square centimeter per month at
any time.
Whenever particulate matter from one air contamination source is dis-
charged through two or more flues, the quantity that may be discharged
from all of the flues shall not exceed the emission that would be per-
mitted by assuming that all of the particulate matter is being emitted
from a single flue having an effective height calculated in the following
manner:
Multiply the effective height of each flue by the percentage of the total
air contaminant emission rate emitted through the flue, add the prod-
ucts and divide the sum by 100.
Whenever particulate matter from more than one air contamination
source is discharged through less flues than the number of air contam-
ination sources, the quantity that may be discharged from each flue
shall not exceed the emission permitted by this Section 1.3 (2) for each
flue except under unusual conditions (see Section 1.4.).
In a similar vein, the court in Commonwealth v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 9 Pa. D. &
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In summary, attacks on the statutes under which DER operates
generally have been unsuccessful. This does not mean, however, that
new statutes or regulations will be free from constitutional infirmities
or that untested areas of existing statutes and regulations are immune
from attack. Nevertheless, defenses in this area must be soundly
based, particularly in light of the presumptions of reasonableness and
constitutionality that courts apply when reviewing challenges to a
statute." Formulating viable defenses in this area is difficult. A dif-
ferent approach, whereby the actions of the agency rather than the
statutes themselves are attacked, has been more successful.
B. Attacks on Actions and Orders of DER and EHB
Even when an environmental statute meets all constitutional
requirements, DER's administration and enforcement of that statute
can present grounds for a valid defense. Although the nature of spe-
cific defenses in this area is dictated by the particular facts and DER
action taken, some general principles may be gleaned from cases in
which actions of DER or other agencies have been attacked.
0 5
1. DER/EHB Action Is Beyond the Power Conferred by the
Legislature.- For any DER action or order to be valid, it must be
promulgated pursuant to and within the limitations of the en-
abling legislation. Whether DER has overstepped these limita-
tions is a factual question. 0 6 Nevertheless, courts have set forth a
C.2d 266 (C.P. Del. 1955), held that a local ordinance (Borough of Trainer Ordi-
nance No. 178, § 2) that prohibited the use of
any . . . building within the limits of the Borough of Trainer, for any
manufacture . . . or use that creates or is likely to create any noxious, of-
fensive, corrosive, toxic or noisome fumes, gas, smoke, odor, dust or vapor
. . . or any other condition that is dangerous to public health ....
was not so vague or indefinite as to be unconstitutional, despite the fact that the ordi-
nance did not set specific particulate concentration standards.
104. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
105. Once again, the scope of a court's review and the standards for reversal
of the agency's actions are important. Judicial review is particularly restricted when
DER resolves complex problems of technology. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal
Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973). In these areas, the courts are especially
aware of the agency's expertise and will generally defer to administrative judgment.
See Sanitary Water Bd. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 78 Dauph. 328, 334, afj'd, 199 Pa.
Super. 492, 185 A.2d 624 (1962).
From the time the Clean Streams Law was first passed in 1937 the Sanitary
Water Board has made many investigations into the various aspects of pollu-
tion and we feel that the Board thereby has acquired a special knowledge
and competence with regard to these matters.
Id. In Commonwealth v. Snyder, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 729 (C.P. York 1972), the court
acknowledged the presumption of correctness in DER's actions, but limited that pre-
sumption to official acts and orders of the agency.
106. With respect to certain statutes, DER's power seems virtually unlimited.
standard whereby "[tihe power and authority to be exercised by
administrative commissions must be conferred by legislative lan-
guage clear and unmistakable. A doubtful power does not exist."' 0 7
Thus, when DER's statutory authority is unclear, courts will find
for defendant.
This principle is illustrated by DER's licensing and per-
mit powers. In Sanitary Water Board v. Sunbeam Coal Corp.108
a coal company applied for a mine drainage permit under the 1965
version of the Clean Streams Law. 10 The Board rejected the
company's application because the company had violated drain-
age permits it held on two other mines. The common pleas
court of Dauphin County held that the Board went beyond its statu-
torily conferred powers when it considered the applicant's violations
of prior or existing permits in its decision on the permit in ques-
tion.110 In another permit case a township granted a permit to a land-
owner to install and use an on-site sewage system. Pursuant to powers
granted by the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act,"' DER revoked
the authority of the township to grant permits because the township
was carrying out its duties improperly. The agency then cancelled
the landowner's permit. The E-B in DER v. Conley"' ruled that
the department went beyond its powers in revoking the per-
mit issued by the municipality since neither the Sewage Facilities Act
nor regulations promulgated thereunder authorized such action.
Similarly, the remedies DER may invoke against alleged pol-
In Peters v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Forests & Waters, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
330, 314 A.2d 584 (1974), landowners challenged the authority of DER to condemn
their land for use as a park. The court held that under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
466(b) (1962), which conferred eminent domain powers on DER, the agency could
condemn "any lands" of unusual scenic beauty for use as state parklands. The court
emphasized the statutory words "any lands" and ruled that DER effectively had com-
plete discretion in regard to its selection. In Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v.
DER, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 341 A.2d 556 (1975), the court affirmed an
EHB ruling that PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-8 (Supp. 1975), which explicitly pro-
vides that DER may attach conditions to any agreement to sell or lease minerals un-
der Commonwealth control, imposes no limits on those conditions except that they
be reasonable.
107. Green v. Milk Control Comm'n, 340 Pa. 1, 3, 16 A.2d 9, cert. denied, 312
U.S. 708 (1940); Elias v. EHB, 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 489, 312 A.2d 486
(1973); Sanitary Water Bd. v. Glen Alden Corp., 83 Dauph. 108 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
108. 91 Dauph. 70 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
109. Act of August 23, 1965, P.L. 372, No. 194 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1966) ).
110. The Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 653, No. 222 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 691.609 (Supp. 1975) ), amended the Clean Streams Law to allow DER to
withhold a mine drainage permit because of the applicant's violations of prior or ex-
isting permits. Nevertheless, Sunbeam Coal still is valid authority for the proposition
that the agency may not consider prior violations in ruling on applications required
under statutes that do not specifically provide that prior violations may be taken into
account.
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35. §§ 750.1-.20 (Supp. 1975).
112. 61Pa. D. & C.2d 676 (EHB 1973).
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luters are limited to those set forth in the statutes. In Commonwealth
v. Glen Alden Corp."' the supreme court held that the pre-1968
version of the Air Pollution Control Act did not provide for a suit in
equity to abate air pollution, even though such a suit was available at
common law. Therefore, the agency was confined to the statutorily
established procedure for abatement." 4 Likewise, the court in Elias
v. EHB" 5 adhered to the principle that an agency may act only within
the powers clearly granted it by the legislature. In that case defend-
ant owned a group of dilapidated buildings that he rented to low-in-
come tenants. DER declared certain dangerous and unhealthful con-
ditions in the buildings to be a nuisance and ordered defendant to
enter into contracts with third parties to abate the nuisance. The
commonwealth court ruled that although the Administrative Code
gave DER the authority to declare a nuisance," 6 it did not give the
agency the power to order a defendant to contract against his will to
abate that nuisance, despite the existence of compelling reasons to
issue such an order." 7 DER also attempted to enjoin defendant from
evicting tenants who had reported the deplorable conditions. The
court held that this action was not maintainable by DER because its
enabling statute did not empower it to alter the basic landlord-tenant
law of Pennsylvania.
In the same vein, DER is without power to subject an alleged
polluter to multiple judicial actions for a single statutory violation
113. 418Pa. 57,210A.2d256(1965).
114. The legislature, prodded by Glen Alden, amended the Air Pollution Control
Act to provide that no statutory procedure shall deprive equity of jurisdiction to
abate. Act of June 12, 1968, P.L. 163, No. 92 (compiled at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 4012.1 (Supp. 1969) ). In Borough of Brookhaven v. American Rendering, Inc.,
434 Pa. 290, 256 A.2d 626 (1969), the court held that this amendment properly con-
fers upon courts of equity the jurisdiction to consider abatement suits under the Air
Pollution Control Act. This was repealed and replaced by a section with substantially
similar provisions. See Act of October 26, 1972, P.L. 989, No. 245 (compiled at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4012.1a (Supp. 1975) ). Nevertheless, the Glen Alden proposi-
tion, that environmental statutes that establish abatement procedures but do not spe-
cifically provide for abatement in equity oust equity jurisdiction, is still valid as to
statutes that fit this description.
115. 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 489, 312 A.2d 486 (1973).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 510-17, 510-19 (Supp. 1975).
117. Accord, Commonwealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 619, 314
A.2d 868 (1973). In this case the court held that neither the Clean Streams Law
nor existing case law authorized DER or the courts to order a municipality to enter
written agreements with others for sewage treatment. In Commonwealth v. City of
Jeanette, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 306, 305 A.2d 774 (1973), the court refused to
enforce a DER order requiring independent municipalities to enter into the financing
and construction of a joint sewage treatment facility. The court was unwilling to
force upon the municipalities a regional plan formulated by the agency, when such
plans were not sanctioned by the legislature.
despite the agency's statutory power to pursue so-called cumula-
tive remedies. In DER v. Leechburg Mining Co."" DER entered
into a consent decree whereby defendant was to submit plans show-
ing the steps it would take to comply with the Clean Streams Law,"'
the Solid Waste Management Act,120 and the Coal Refuse Disposal
Control Act.' 2 ' Subsequently DER sought an injunction to force de-
fendant to comply with provisions of the aforementioned statutes,
even though defendant was not in violation of the consent decree
and was acting to comply with it. The court held that although the
statutes explicitly provided the agency with cumulative remedies
against a violator, the provisions merely gave DER a choice of reme-
dies. The doctrine of election of remedies was found as applicable
to administrative agencies as to any other party. Once DER has
chosen a particular remedy, it is confined to that method as the ex-
clusive means of enforcement. Since DER had entered a consent de-
cree with defendant, it could not then seek an injunction in a paral-
lel proceeding that would subject defendant to multiple litigation,
possible harassment, and potentially inconsistent results. 22 Thus, un-
less the legislature clearly and unambiguously establishes otherwise,
the cumulative remedies provided by various environmental statutes
merely give DER a choice of remedies, not a number of remedies
that it may pursue simultaneously.
In summary, courts are unwilling to allow DER to exercise auth-
ority not specifically granted to it by statute and they strictly construe
the statutory provisions under which the agency carries on its licens-
ing and permit activities.' 21 In dealing with alleged polluters
24
DER's remedies are limited to those granted by its enabling acts, even
though this deprives the agency of remedies available at common
law.125 The availability of defenses in this area depends upon the
particular facts, the specific DER action, and the enabling statutes
involved. In situations in which DER's conduct does not clearly con-
form to statutory mandates, a viable defense may arise.
2. DER/EHB Action Is Arbitrary, Capricious, Involves Abuse
of Discretion or Is Not Based on Substantial Evidence.--Courts often
base their reversal of an agency's action or adjudication on the
118. 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 297, 305 A.2d 764 (1973).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1975).
120. Id. §§ 6001-17.
121. Id. tit. 52, §§ 30.51-.62 (Supp. 1975).
122. DER may seek injunctive relief if the defendant violates the consent decree.
Commonwealth v. United States Steel Corp., 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184, 325
A.2d 324 (1974).
123. See notes 108-12 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 113-14, 118-22 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 113-14 and accompanying text supra.
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ground that such action was arbitrary or capricious. 126 Reversals also
will be based on a finding that the agency's ruling does not rest on
substantial evidence. 2 7 These criteria are often cited by courts, but
are seldom explained. 2 " An agency must have some factual
basis for its decision, but just how much of a basis is required
to remove the agency's actions from the realm of arbitrary and capri-
cious conduct is unclear. In this regard, the agency occupies a
favored position because of the presumption of reasonableness in
state actions'29 and the broad discretion given to agencies that pro-
tect public health and welfare. 130 Thus, a defendant must make a
strong showing of abuse before a court will overturn an agency or-
der.'
13
The difficulties faced by a party who contends that an environ-
mental agency has abused its discretion are illustrated by Peters v.
Commonwealth, Department of Forests and Waters.13 2 In that case
DER sought to take Peters' land under a statute 3 empowering the
agency to condemn "any lands of unusual scenic beauty . . . with
unique and interesting features" that in DER's judgment should be
utilized as state parkland. Peters argued that his land was not unique,
unusual, or even interesting and that it was merely woodland and
underbrush similar to thousands of acres in the state. He contended
that DER's choice was arbitrary and that the agency had abused its
discretion by ignoring statutory standards for selecting areas to
be condemned. The court rejected this argument, concentrating on
the statutory language "any lands" and ignoring the modifying phrase
126. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
127. Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.44 (1962).
128. But see Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rnv. 509 (1974). Judge Leventhal argues that the primary
role of the courts in policing administrative adjudications is to assure that the agency
has taken a good faith "hard look" at all factors pertinent to its decision and that
its order or adjudication is based on that "hard look."
129. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
130. City of Philadelphia v. Watt, 162 Pa. Super. 433, 57 A.2d 591 (1948).
When public health and safety are at stake, an agency has broad powers even to the
extent of anticipating potential dangers to the public and prescribing reasonable meth-
ods of abating those dangers. Similarly, agencies have broad discretion with regard
to environmental pollution matters and the abatement of potential pollution. Sani-
tary Water Bd. v. Mico Enter., Inc., 84 Dauph. 111 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
131. City of Philadelphia v. Watt, 162 Pa. Super. 433, 57 A.2d 591 (1948);
Peters v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Forests & Waters, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 330,
314 A.2d 584 (1974).
132. 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 330, 314 A.2d 584 (1974).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 466(b) (1962). This section has been replaced
by § 510-6(2) (Supp. 1975), which is substantially similar.
"of unusual scenic beauty." The court ruled that under the statute
DER was given complete discretion to select land best suited for
outdoor recreation and education. Judges Mencer and Crumlish dis-
sented, arguing that the record contained no evidence that Peters'
land was at all unique or unusual and that the absence of such evi-
dence indicated that DER had ignored the statutory standards and
abused its discretion.
Another example of the stiff burden confronting defendants who
try to prove abuse of discretion is F. & T. Construction Co.
v. DER.' In that case the court held that DER's refusal to grant
a license, permit, or time extension to a party who in good faith
had invested time, effort, and money in an enterprise that never-
theless failed to comply with environmental standards was not
grounds in itself for finding an abuse of discretion.' 35 Although DER
must consider economic factors in arriving at its decision, 136 courts
will not second-guess the agency on matters of judgment, even when
DER gives little or no weight to economic evidence.'3 7
On the other hand, abuse of discretion has been found in
instances when the agency clearly ignored pertinent and impor-
tant facts in arriving at its decision. For example, in Common-
wealth v. United States Steel Corp.'38 DER was denied a preliminary
injunction against an alleged discharge of oil into a public sewer when
the agency failed to prove that defendant was causing this dis-
charge and ignored defendant's installation of treatment equipment
that reduced concentration of pollutants in the discharge to levels
far below statutory minimum standards. The court, in finding an
abuse of discretion in the agency's refusal to approve defendant's
construction of additional facilities, was particularly critical of DER's
134. 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 59,293 A.2d 138 (1972).
135. id. at 61-62, 293 A.2d at 139-40. In this case a housing developer sought
an exception to a DER ban on additional connections to a sewage system. When
DER denied the exception, the developer contended that the denial constituted an
abuse of discretion because it would cause him to lose $76,000 that he had already
spent on planning and development. The court rejected the developer's argument and
ruled that once the necessity for the DER ban was shown, the burden was on the
developer to show why he was entitled to an exception. The fact that he had ex-
pended large sums of money was not sufficiently compelling to require an exception
and DER was therefore justified in its refusal.
136. Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. DER, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,
341 A.2d 556 (1975).
137. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), aff'd sub nor. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). Bortz contended that DER acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in refusing to grant a three-year time extension for the coal com-
pany to comply with air pollution emission standards in light of the fact that without
such extension the company might be driven out of business. The court rejected this
argument and ruled that the weight to be given to economic evidence was a matter
of discretion with the agency and would not be questioned by the court.
138. 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 583 (C.P. Allegheny 1972).
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admitted failure to consider defendant's treatment measures.1
39
The "lack of substantial evidence" defense is closely related to
the "arbitrary and capricious conduct" defense. An agency acts in
an arbitrary and capricious manner when its conclusions and conduct
are not based on substantial evidence. The substantial evidence re-
quired to support a finding of an administrative tribunal is something
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. 140 It is such relevant evidence
as is sufficient to convince reasonable minds to a fair degree of
certainty.
1 4 1
Although DER is not bound by technical rules of evidence,'42
139. The court stated,
If there could or should be one central fact that stands out above all others,
it is our finding that the Commonwealth not only refused to approve the
construction and installation of equipment that would have diminished any
improper and/or unlawful discharge, if we could find one as we did not;
it is the admitted refusal by the Commonwealth's officers not only to ap-
prove the plan for even more facilities relevant to the Commonwealth's
complaint, but the candid statement of the Commonwealth's witness in
charge of this matter that he was given no reason for such refusal.
Id. at 595. In Sanitary Water Bd. v. Mico Enter., Inc., 84 Dauph. 111 (Pa. C.P.
1965), the agency approved a developer's application for a permit to construct a sew-
age treatment facility, but subsequently denied a request for a permit to discharge
the treated effluent. The developer argued that the Board abused its discretion by
wilfully disregarding evidence that the discharge would meet all pollution standards.
The court agreed, noting the lack of any grounds upon which the Board might base
its permit refusal and ordering the agency to issue the requested permit.
An agency can abuse its discretion not only by failing to consider factors im-
portant to its decision, but also by considering extraneous factors not defined by the
legislature as pertinent to the agency's determination. In Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sun-
beam Coal Corp., 91 Dauph. 70 (Pa. C.P. 1969), the court held that it was beyond
the power conferred by the Clean Streams Law for the Board to consider prior viola-
tions under other mine drainage permits in ruling on an application for an independ-
ent permit. The court ruled that the Board's conduct in this respect was arbitrary
and capricious.
140. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Kaufmann Dep't Stores, Inc., 345 Pa.
398, 29 A.2d 90 (1942); A.P. Weaver & Sons v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971).
141. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Kaufmann Dep't Stores, Inc., 345 Pa.
398, 29 A.2d 90 (1942); A.P. Weaver & Sons v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971); Air Pollution Comm'n v. C.F. Manbeck, Inc.,
88 Dauph. 331 (Pa. C.P. 1967). The burden of proof is on the moving party.
When DER claims that a party is in violation of a statute, regulation, or permit and
orders the party to discontinue the violation, DER has the burden of proving the vio-
lation upon appeal to EHB. DER v. Leon E. Kocher Coal Co., 9 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 110, 305 A.2d 784 (1973). When no criminal sanctions are involved,
DER need only prove its cause by a preponderance of the evidence. North Am.
Coal Corp. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356
(1971). When a party seeks an exception to a general DER ban or otherwise seeks
equitable relief in an action that is not an appeal from an EHB adjudication, that
party has the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested exception or relief.
F. & T. Construction Co. v. DER, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 59, 293 A.2d
138 (1972).
142. The technical rules of evidence do not apply to EHB hearings. PA. STAT.
courts sometimes have shown a distrust for the agency's claims
and have closely scrutinized evidence offered in DER adjudications.
In this regard, courts have applied a substantial evidence require-
ment that mandates that, when possible, DER must present objective,
factual data rather than mere opinion evidence to support its conten-
tions. In A.P. Weaver & Sons v. Sanitary Water Board43 the
Board attempted to introduce written reports and studies on the
cause and effect of pollution in a spring near defendant's coal min-
ing operations. The court held that such reports, which contained
the opinions and conclusions of an agency field expert, were inad-
missible unless the expert was available to testify and be cross-
examined. The court ruled that defendant's mine drainage permit
could not be revoked on the basis of mere speculation and unsup-
ported assumptions. DER was required to show a causal connection
between defendant's operations and the alleged pollution by "hard"
evidence.
Similarly, courts have held that DER must use scientific tests
to prove the existence of violations of environmental quality stan-
dards. 144 In fact, when such tests are available and can be safely con-
ducted,145 visual or other evidence will not suffice, even though the
visual evidence may have been obtained by trained and experienced
experts. 14 6 In such a situation, lack of scientific tests may be grounds
ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.32 (1962). Nevertheless, parties to an agency hearing must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine opposing party witnesses. A.P.
Weaver & Sons v. Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515
(1971).
143. 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 284 A.2d 515 (1971).
144. In Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
458-59, 279 A.2d 388, 398 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973), the court stated,
Somehow, regulatory agencies such as the Air Pollution Commission and
its employees, take the attitude that because they represent the government,
there is no need for them to prove facts, except as established by the esti-
mates and observations of their experts. Merely because the Common-
wealth employs experts in the various fields of regulation does not necessar-
ily mean that the Commonwealth need not prove its case. In the event it
should occur in a case that there is no scientific measurement instrument,
or no method for determining a violation, then, as in all adjudicated matters
in this Commonwealth, violations will have to be determined upon the
weight of the evidence produced. However, where there are available estab-
lished methods for determining violations, those methods must be used ...
To permit the Commission to order an abatement based solely upon the
visual tests and observations of one employee strikes at the heart of fairness
envisioned in every judicial process known to our system of jurisprudence.
145. The court in United States Steel Corp. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
429, 300 A.2d 508 (1973), emphasized that the use of scientific tests is necessary
only when they can be conducted safely and practically. In United States Steel it was
held that a test sample of a suspected polluting discharge of industrial waste taken
one foot downstream from the discharge point was adequate when it would have been
dangerous for a DER employee to take the sample directly from the discharge pipe
itself.
146. DER v. Leon E. Kocher Coal Co., 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 110, 305 A.2d
784 (1973); North Am. Coal Corp. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971) (scientific tests must be used if available and
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for dismissal or reversal against the agency for lack of substantial
evidence.
147
In summary, DER must present some ascertainable, factual
basis for its actions to defeat the contention that the actions are
arbitrary and capricious. The actions also must comply with the
agency's statutorily conferred power or at least be consistent with a
statute's purpose and policy to withstand allegations of abuse of dis-
cretion. Finally, DER must offer substantial evidence, not mere ex-
pressions of opinion, to prove that its actions are necessary.
3. Procedural Inadequacies in DER's Actions.-DER is further
constrained by various statutorily established procedures designed to
protect a regulated party from arbitrary conduct on the part of the
agency and assure the fairness of administrative hearings. If DER's
conduct does not conform to the required procedure, a viable de-
fense may arise. The test is whether DER's procedurally nonconform-
ing conduct has prejudiced the regulated party. When it has, the
action may be reversed or execution of the agency's orders delayed
to allow the aggrieved party to prepare a defense.
When DER substantially complies with statutory procedures,
minor irregularities will not affect the validity of its order if the
affected party was not misled about the finality of the steps being
taken by the agency 48 and was not prevented from questioning and
challenging the propriety, authorization, or any other aspect of the
agency's action.' Thus, when DER issues an order, but fails to
practical; if they are not available, the agency must explain why and extraordinary
care must be taken to assure accuracy of expert's visual evidence and conclusions);
Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441, 279 A.2d
388 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 362,
299 A.2d 670 (1973); Commonwealth v. Prince Mfg. Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 69 (C.P.
Carbon 1971).
147. North Am. Coal Corp. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971); Commonwealth v. Prince Mfg. Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d
69 (C.P. Carbon 1971).
148. Avery v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 105, 276 A.2d 843
(1971).
149. Peters v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Forests & Waters, 12 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 330, 314 A.2d 584 (1974). Note, however, that a court will not overlook
DER's procedural deficiencies merely because the agency desires a speedy abatement
of existing pollution. In Commonwealth v. Washington Tp., 12 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 273, 316 A.2d 107 (1974), DER sought to have several municipalities held in
contempt for failure to obey a DER order to enter a joint sewage treatment facility
plan. Although a municipality may be held in contempt immediately upon failure
to comply with a DER order under § 210 of the Clean Streams Law (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 691.210 (Supp. 1975)), DER cited a different section of the statute in its
pleadings. The court dismissed the case without prejudice, refusing to overlook
follow the formal procedure for informing the regulated party
of what it must do to appeal and obtain a hearing, the irregu-
larity will not be fatal if DER informally notifies the party of the
procedure for appeal and hearing by attaching a notice to the
order. 150 The primary requirement is that the aggrieved party be
given notice of DER's action and an opportunity to contest it.
The requirement that an administrative agency provide notice151
and hearing before taking any final action affecting a party's rights
is established by the Administrative Agency Law.' 52 Notice in situa-
tions other than formal actions may also be required. 5 a Just how
formal such notice must be is unclear. For example, in United States
Steel Corp. v. DER' EHB assessed a penalty against defendant
for a violation of section 401 of the Clean Streams Law,' 55 even
though the original complaint did not mention that section. The
court held that in some instances the lack of a specific statutory cita-
tion in a complaint may be fatal, but in this case DER's complaint
was sufficiently general to put defendant on notice of what he had to
defend. 5 6 A DER complaint that pleads conclusively that a de-
fendant is polluting and will cause irreparable harm, however, is
not sufficiently specific to apprise a defendant of the facts on
which DER bases its claim.'
5 7
DER's procedural error despite the agency's request that it do so for the sake of
speedy pollution abatement and in the interest of carrying out legislative intent.
150. Commonwealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 619, 314 A.2d
868 (1973).
151. The requirement of notice includes the requirement that DER prove that
the regulated party was given adequate notice of the regulations and standards either
through published standards, rules, and regulations or through individual communica-
tions or instructions to the regulated party. Commonwealth v. Toro Dev. Co., 2 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 429, 433 (1971). Publication of the standards or regulations in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin provides adequate notice. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1504
(Supp. 1975).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31 (1962) provides that no valid adjudica-
tion may be made by an administrative agency without prior notice to and an oppor-
tunity to be heard by the affected party. Although the Administrative Code of 1929,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-21(c) (Supp. 1975), provides that DER may take any
action initially without regard to the Administrative Agency Law, it also provides
that such action is not final until the person adversely affected has had an opportun-
ity to appeal to EHB. Because initial DER orders (those orders informing a
party that he is in violation and demanding that he take action to cease violation)
are not final, there is no right to notice and hearing before their issuance. Common-
wealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 619, 314 A.2d 868 (1973); In re
Sellersville Borough, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 284 (EHB 1973).
153. In DER v. Conley, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 676 (EHB 1973), EHB commented
that DER might be required to give notice to a landowner when it intends to enter
his land to take soil tests so that the landowner might be present to protect his inter-
ests.
154. 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 429, 300 A.2d 508 (1973).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.401 (Supp. 1975).
156. But see Commonwealth v. Washington Tp., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 273,
316 A.2d 107 (1974); note 149 supra.




The notice requirements also impose upon DER an additional
element of proof since the usual presumption that the agency has
acted correctly and in accordance with proper authority does not
apply. 5 " DER must prove that it has given the proper notice to a
defendant159 and when the agency seeks criminal sanctions against
an alleged polluter, notice must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. °60 Mere proof that the order was entered in agency records
does not prove that defendant received the order nor that he was
put on notice of a pollution control violation.' 6 '
A party's right to a hearing is as important as his right to no-
tice."'62 Thus, a DER action is not final until the party has been
given ample opportunity to be heard. The right to a hearing may be
waived, 163 but absent a waiver an agency's failure to provide the re-
quired hearing may result in reversal of the agency's action.6 4 At a
hearing the aggrieved party must be given the opportunity to rebut
DER's case and confront and cross-examine DER's witnesses.
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4. Miscellaneous Defenses.--Other defenses to actions of en-
vironmental agencies exist, but they do not fit within any of the
aforementioned categories. These defenses include contentions that
defendant was not at fault in causing the alleged pollution, estoppel
arguments alleging that the Commonwealth is precluded from en-
158. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 729 (C.P. York 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (C.P. Fulton 1969).
159. Commonwealth v. Toro Dev. Co., 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 429 (1971).
160. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 729 (C.P. York 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (C.P. Fulton 1969).
161. Commonwealth v. Heindel, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 205 (C.P. York 1967). This
case also held that when the defendant failed to perfect his appeal under agency regu-
lations, but the agency did not prove that he ever received the order or notice of his
violation, the defendant may collaterally attack the validity of the order.
162. Nevertheless, under PA. R. Civ. P. 1098, summary judgment may be entered
against an environmental litigant before he has pleaded to the merits when such entry
is necessary to protect the public interest and when the Commonwealth's right to
summary judgment is clear and unquestionable. See Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett
v. Borough of Cokeburg, 89 Dauph. 362 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel.
Alessandroni v. Borough of Confluence, 87 Dauph. 214 (Pa. C.P. 1967), a/I'd, 427
Pa. 540, 234 A.2d 852 (1967).
163. Failure to perfect an appeal to EHB within the statutory time period
may constitute a waiver. Commonwealth v. Derry Tp., 10 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
619, 314 A.2d 868 (1973).
164. Commonwealth v. Heindel, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 205 (C.P. York 1967).
165. A party is not denied a proper hearing merely because of the short length
of time allotted therefor, provided that he has been afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses and present rebuttal evidence. Sanitary Water Bd. v. Borough of
Coudersport, 81 Dauph. 178 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
forcing environmental regulations, and defenses based on the alleged
polluter's partial compliance with agency orders.'" 6
The defense that a party did not intend to pollute or violate
an environmental statute or regulation is meritless when it is shown
that the party, in fact, did pollute or violate the statute. For example,
in Middletown Township Municipal Authority v. DER67 a municipal
authority operated a sewage facility for a township under permits
issued by DER. To prevent overloading, the permits contained a
limitation on the number of connections that could be made to the
system. Without the knowledge or consent of the municipal author-
ity, the township made additional hookups and exceeded the limita-
tions set by the permits. In holding the municipal authority civilly
liable for violation of the permits, the court ruled that the authority's
lack of knowledge or consent to the violative hookups was immaterial
absent a showing of any action by the authority to enforce the permits'
conditions. 16s Similarly, a party's lack of intent to pollute is wholly
immaterial when his conduct constitutes a public nuisance, 69 whether
the public nuisance is of common-law or statutory origin. 17  In addi-
tion, a defendant who is not actively polluting can be convicted of a
Clean Streams Law violation by merely permitting conditions on his
land to cause water pollution, even though the violation causes no
injury.' 71 Finally, an employer may be held liable for acts of his
employees performed within the scope of their employment, despite
166. For other defenses see Daniels v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 391 Pa. 195, 137
A.2d 304 (1958) (contracts between parties cannot relieve an individual from general
liability for a public nuisance nor excuse his violation of the Clean Streams Law);
Middletown Tp. Mun. Auth. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 545, 300 A.2d 515
(1973) (the environmental policy of the Commonwealth as announced by the legis-
lature cannot be rendered unenforceable by a contract between individuals); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Irwin Borough, 91 Dauph. 270 (Pa. C.P. 1969) (failure
of a neighboring municipality to enter a joint antipollution effort with defendant is no
defense to the latter's violation of the Clean Streams Law); Sanitary Water Bd. v.
Borough of Coudersport, 81 Dauph. 178 (Pa. C.P. 1963) (fact that stream will purge
and cleanse itself within seven miles of defendant's illegal sewage discharge is no de-
fense to a mandamus action to compel compliance with Clean Streams Law).
167. 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 545, 300 A.2d 515 (1973).
168. Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Borough of Houtzdale, 91
Dauph. 109 (Pa. C.P. 1969) (involves a factual situation similar to that in Middle-
town Tp. Mun. Auth. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 545, 300 A.2d 515 (1973)).
169. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871
(1974).
170. See Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super. 493, 66 A.2d 584 (1949)
(dealt with § 302 of the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.302
(1964), under which any discharge injurious to animal or aquatic life was declared
to be a nuisance).
171. Commonwealth v. Ebersole, 59 Lanc. 363 (Pa. C.P. 1965). In Common-
wealth v. Wyeth Lab., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 227, 315 A.2d 648 (1974), the court
held that a landowner who was not affirmatively polluting and who was blameless
as to the conditions of his land that caused the pollution will not be required to abate




the fact that the employer did not order or have knowledge of those
acts.
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A long-standing failure of an environmental agency to act
against a party is generally no defense when the agency finally does
take some action.' 71 It frequently has been held that a party can-
not gain a prescriptive or property right to pollute, no matter how
long its unlawful conduct has been tolerated.'7 4 Thus, a defendant's
operation of smoke-belching, beehive coke ovens for over seventy
years before the Commonwealth acted was found immaterial once
it was established that the party was violating air pollution stand-
ards.' 75 Moreover, when a party asserts the defense of laches against
the State, he must make a stronger showing of prejudicial delay than
is required when only private rights are involved.176 When substan-
tial prejudice to defendant's position is clearly shown to have been
caused by the Commonwealth's action or inaction, however, the
Commonwealth will be estopped from belatedly enforcing environ-
mental statutes that are admittedly being violated.' 77 For example,
in DER v. Conley 7 s EHB held that DER was estopped from revok-
172. Commonwealth v. Zebner Bros. Farm Prod., 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (C.P.
Columbia 1972).
173. Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super. 493, 66 A.2d 584 (1949). In
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974), the court
held that the police power could not be lost by nonexercise and remains to be exerted
as conditions and exigencies demand.
174. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871
(1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79
A.2d 439 (1951); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A.
386 (1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 592 (1925); Commonwealth v. Clearview Land
Dev. Co., 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 241 (C.P. Del. 1972).
175. Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
279 A.2d 388 (1971), af 'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). See also Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. DER,
- Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, -, 341 A.2d 556, 560 (1975) (company gains no
vested right in riverbed by investing millions of dollars in dredging over 45 years).
176. Bradford v. New York & Pa. Tel. & Tel. Co., 206 Pa. 582, 56 A.
41 (1903); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Bala & Bryn Mawr Turnpike
Co., 153 Pa. 47, 25 A. 1105 (1893). See also Commonwealth v. Clearview Land
Dev. Co., 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 241 (C.P. Del. 1972) (Commonwealth's 13-year delay
in enforcing provisions of the Air Pollution Control Act, Clean Streams Law, and
Solid Waste Management Act will not prevent issuance of an injunction when delay
has not caused defendant to significantly and detrimentally change his position).
177. Stahl v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 411 Pa. 121, 191 A.2d 386 (1963).
But in Commonwealth v. Folcroft Landfill Corp., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 356
(1971), the court held that the fact that state officials aided the defendant in setting
up his operations and procuring a borough permit and subsequently inspected the op-
erations on a regular basis over an eight-year period would not estop the Common-
wealth from enjoining further operation because of violations of the Solid Waste
Management Act and the Air Pollution Control Act.
178. 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 676 (EHB 1973).
ing a landowner's onsite sewage treatment permit because the land-
owner would not have bought the land had he not obtained the per-
mit.179 It is doubtful, however, that the Commonwealth can be
estopped from preventing conduct that presents an immediate threat
to the health and safety of the public.
Finally, a party's unsuccessful attempt to comply with an en-
vironmental agency's order to abate its unlawful conduct within rea-
sonable time limits set by the agency is no defense to an action by
the agency for an injunction to enforce compliance with the order,
although it may be considered in a contempt proceeding. 8 °
IV. Technical and Economic Infeasibility
A controversial area of environmental control litigation involves
the defense that agency regulations or orders are impossible to comply
with. Impossibility may be either technical or economic. The dis-
tinction is minimal, however, since technical infeasibility can usually
be overcome if sufficient funds are available.
Traditionally the defense of impossibility was unavailable in
actions to enjoin a public nuisance"" absent explicit legislative pro-
visions to the contrary. A public nuisance will be enjoined without
regard to the hardships placed upon defendant or any balancing
of the equities. 182 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 8 3 "the controversy ...
179. Although this case is of limited value as a precedent since it merely repre-
sents an EHB adjudication and since EHB also rejected the DER action on other
grounds (i.e., it was beyond the power of DER to revoke a permit issued by a politi-
cal subdivision under the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 750.1-.20 (Supp. 1975), and this ground alone was sufficient to reverse the DER
action), it is at least indicative of the type of situation in which estoppel may be
found.
180. Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. North Huntingdon Tp., 91 Dauph. 106
(Pa. C.P. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of Saxton, 87
Dauph. 222 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of
Confluence, 87 Dauph. 214 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v.
Borough of Lewisville, 85 Dauph. 97 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Ales-
sandroni v. Eldred Borough, 85 Dauph. 93 (Pa. C.P. 1966). In each of these cases,
a writ of mandamus was issued to municipal officials ordering them to immediately
comply with Sanitary Water Board orders to build sewage treatment facilities. The
writs were issued after a two-year period for compliance had expired and the facilities
were not yet operational despite the fact that the municipalities had begun planning
and construction. Nor is it a defense that the party will definitely comply with an
abatement order at a later date. Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of
Applewold, 87 Dauph. 209 (Pa. C.P. 1967) and cases cited above.
181. This contrasts with private nuisance situations in which the hardship
caused the plaintiff by defendant's acts must be balanced with the burdens that abate-
ment would place on the defendant. When the defendant proves that the nuisance
is unavoidable or that it may only be abated at an inordinate cost to him, abatement
will not be compelled. Herring v. H.W. Walker Co., 409 Pa. 126, 185 A.2d 565
(1962).
182. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79
A.2d 439 (1951).
183. 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 592 (1925).
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is controlled by one fact and a single equitable principle: the fact
that the stream has been polluted, and the principle that this creates
an enjoinable nuisance, if the public uses the water."184 Since sev-
eral environmental statutes contain provisions whose violation auto-
matically constitutes a public nuisance, 185 a defendant violating those
provisions is effectively precluded from pleading impossibility as a
defense to an injunction.
Existing Pennsylvania environmental control statutes generally
do not require that DER consider economic or technical factors
or the regulated party's economic status. 86 Similarly, the courts
have not been swayed by considerations of undue economic
hardship 87 or unique difficulties that compliance would impose on
184. Id. at 238, 126 A. at 387; accord, Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974).
185. See, e.g., the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.202 (sew-
age discharge), 691.307 (industrial waste discharge), 691.315 (mine operations),
691.402 (operations without permits), 691.610 (violation of DER order) (Supp.
1975). Similarly, the Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4013,
4013.4 (Supp. 1975), declares violations of any provisions of the act or any orders
of DER to be public nuisances.
186. Provisions impliedly requiring such considerations have been expunged
from the state's two principal pollution control statutes, the Clean Streams Law and
the Air Pollution Control Act. In the original version of the Clean Streams Law,
Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, No. 394, the legislature excluded acid mine drain-
age from the provisions of the act "until such time as, in the opinion of the Sanitary
Water Board, practical means for the removal of the polluting properties become
known." This indicates that the legislature was cognizant of the importance of coal
mining to the state economy and of the lack of existing means for treating mine
drainage. The 1945 amendment to the Clean Streams Law, Act of May 8, 1945,
P.L. 435, No. 177, which prohibited discharges of mine drainage into "clean" streams,
but did not preclude such discharges into already polluted streams, signalled the first
real recognition by the legislature of the widespread detrimental effect of mine drain-
age. The 1965 amendment, Act of Aug. 23, 1965, P.L. 372, No. 194, further tough-
ened the law by prohibiting mine drainage discharges into "clean" streams. For a
discussion of the 1965 amendments to the Clean Streams Law, particularly with re-
spect to the legislature's consideration of economic and historical factors, see Com-
ment, Pollution Control Under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, 34 U. PITr. L.
REV. 115, 123 (1972). The 1970 amendment, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 653, No.
222, removed all distinctions between mine drainage and other industrial wastes.
Thus, the history of the Clean Streams Law is a classic illustration of changing legis-
lative attitudes toward pollution as influenced by advances in technology, a growing
awareness of the detrimental effects of pollution, and a decline in the economic im-
portance of the regulated industry. It remains to be seen whether the legislature will
revise the law because of the resurgence of the state coal mining industry.
The Air Pollution Control Act underwent similar changes. The original act,
Act of January 8, 1960, P.L. 2119, No. 787, was limited and conciliatory, stressing
the state's desire to continue to attract business and industry and requiring that air
pollution abatement orders promulgated by the Air Pollution Commission be tech-
nically feasible and economically reasonable. The 1968 amendment to the act, Act
of June 12, 1968, P.L. 163, No. 92, dropped the explicit requirement that air pollution
abatement orders be technically and economically reasonable.
187. In Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 441,
a defendant. 188 For example, a municipality's financial inability to
comply with a sewage treatment order promulgated under the Clean
Streams Law was held to be no defense.'8 9 When a municipality has
been ordered to discontinue the discharge of untreated sewage into
public waters and to construct sewage treatment facilities, the fact
that compliance with such an order would waste taxpayers' money, 90
would require expenditures exceeding the municipality's assessed
property valuation or constitutional debt limitation,'' and might
drive the municipality into bankruptcy' 92 is not relevant to the issu-
ance of a writ of mandamus compelling compliance. 193
Consistent with this approach, courts in the past have not re-
quired administrative agencies to consider the economic impact or
technical feasibility of agency orders absent a clear legislative man-
date.1 94 The commonwealth court in dictum expressed a similar view
279 A.2d 388 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973), the court was not moved by the admitted fact that
affirmance of the agency's abatement order would effectively outlaw the operation
of beehive coke ovens in the state and drive hundreds of individuals into the ranks
of the unemployed. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Northwestern
Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 'U.S. 486 (1916), held that the harshness of state or
local antipollution laws or their detrimental effect on business interests does not
raise a valid constitutional objection to such laws.
188. In Sanitary Water Bd. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 199 Pa. Super. 492, 185
A.2d 624 (1962), the court rejected the defendant-municipality's contentions that un-
usual land subsidence problems in the only area where the defendant could practically
build a sewage treatment facility made construction of such a facility infeasible and
thereby excused the municipality from compliance with an agency order.
189. Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Confluence Borough, 427 Pa. 540,
234 A.2d 852 (1967). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Borough of Houtz-
dale, 91 Dauph. 109 (Pa. C.P. 1969); notes 191-92 infra.
190. Sanitary Water Bd. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 199 Pa. Super. 492, 185 A.2d
624 (1962).
191. Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Borough of Irwin, 91 Dauph. 270 (Pa.
C.P. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Dunbar Tp., 91 Dauph. 103 (Pa. C.P.
1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of Greensboro, 87 Dauph.
219 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of Applewold,
87 Dauph. 209 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of
Tionesta, 87 Dauph. 204 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v.
Borough of Coudersport, 85 Dauph. 82 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Sanitary Water Bd. v. New
Oxford Mun. Auth., 79 Dauph. 316 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
192. Sanitary Water Bd. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 199 Pa. Super. 492, 185 A.2d
624 (1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Dunbar Tp., 89 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P.
1968); Sanitary Water Bd. v. Borough of Coudersport, 81 Dauph. 178 (Pa. C.P.
1963).
193. This rule applies even though the municipality comprises an economically
depressed area and compliance with the agency order would impose tax burdens on
citizens who might be unable to meet such burdens. Commonwealth v. Frailey Tp.,
62 Pa. D. & C.2d 258 (EHB 1973).
194. In Sanitary Water Bd. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 199 Pa. Super. 492, 500,
185 A.2d 624, 627 (1962), the court stated, in regard to the Clean Streams Law,
The legislature gave to the board certain specific tests to be applied in deter-
mining whether a city should be required to cease discharging untreated
sewage into the Commonwealth's waters. Whether it is economically inad-
visable for the city to build a sewage treatment plant or whether such con-
struction may constitute a waste of taxpayers' money, were not among the
tests. Discontinuance of the discharge should be ordered, says the legis-




when reviewing DER's issuance of an air pollution abatement order
under the Air Pollution Control Act. 1 5 The court's view is question-
able, however, in light of the policy statement in that act'16 that air
pollution control should not obstruct the state policy of attracting, de-
veloping, and expanding industry. This policy requires at least cur-
sory consideration by DER of the economic and technical feasibility
of compliance with any air pollution abatement order. 1 7
When DER brings a contempt proceeding to enforce an order,
on the other hand, impossibility of compliance, either technical or
economic, is a circumstance that must be considered by the courts
and may be an adequate defense. 98 In addition, an impossibility de-
fense can be based on actions of the Commonwealth that have ren-
dered compliance impossible. 199
Some considerations that are important when raising the de-
fense of impossibility in a contempt proceeding were discussed in
DER v. Pennsylvania Power Co. 20  The court held that when a party
be of the opinion that such discharge of sewage is or may become inimical
or injurious to the public health, animal or aquatic life, or to the use of
the water for domestic or industrial consumption or recreation ... 
These are the tests given by the legislature to the board.
Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Dunbar Tp., 89 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P.
1968).
195. DER v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 212, 316 A.2d
96 (1974).
196. See note 186 supra.
197. See notes 205-11 and accompanying text infra as to developing law with
regard to economic considerations.
198. Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Confluence Borough, 427 Pa. 540,
234 A.2d 852 (1967); Ramey Borough v. DER, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 601, 327
A.2d 647 (1974).
199. In Sanitary Water Bd. v. Blue Coal Corp., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 582 (C.P.
Dauph. 1971), a coal company had submitted plans for and begun construction on
a waste water treatment plant at one of its mines. Subsequently, the company com-
plied with the Board's request that certain special equipment that the company had
obtained for the treatment facility be sent to another of the company's mines and
used there. This substantially contributed to the company's failure to complete the
treatment facility on time. The Board sought to have the company held in contempt
for failure to meet the agency's construction deadline. The court refused to hold the
defendant in contempt, noting that part of the delay was caused by the company's
compliance with the Commonwealth's request. The court held that contempt would
not issue when, despite the defendant's bona fide efforts, meeting of the deadline set
by the agency was made impossible by unavoidable circumstances, particularly when
some of those circumstances were caused by the conduct of the state.
200. 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 212, 316 A.2d 96 (1974). In this case a utility
had installed particulate removal devices to comply with Department of Health emis-
sions standards. Subsequently, the standards were revised and the Department
ordered compliance with the revision. At that time, there were no standards for sul-
fur dioxide emissions, although the state was in the process of formulating such
standards. On this basis, the utility requested that it not be required to comply with
the new particulate emission regulations until sulfur dioxide standards were promul.
raises the defense of impossibility in a contempt proceeding, that
party must prove that compliance, indeed, is infeasible.201 Then, the
burden shifts to the Commonwealth, which must overcome defend-
ant's showing of impossibility or the case will be dismissed. Thus,
defendant's good faith effort to comply will be an important factor
in the court's determination 21 2 and, when combined with a showing
of impossibility, will avoid a contempt citation for noncompliance.
Although the existence of the impossibility defense in contempt
proceedings is heartening to defendants who cannot comply with a
DER order, the limitation of this defense to contempt proceedings
curtails its usefulness. The rationale for disallowing impossibility
as a defense in an injunction action is unclear. Chief Justice Bell
and Justice Roberts in their dissent to Commonwealth ex rel. Ales-
sandroni v. Confluence Borough2 3 expressed the view that allowing
a defense in a contempt proceeding to enforce an order whose original
issuance could not have been avoided by the same defense is judicial
folly. This view is shared by Judge Kramer of the commonwealth
court, who in his dissenting opinion in Ramey Borough v. DER2 4
stated that to allow the impossibility defense in a contempt proceed-
ing, but not in the initial mandamus or injunction action that ordered
compliance wastes time, effort, and litigation expense. Although the
rule disallowing an impossibility defense in injunction and mandamus
gated. The Department of Health denied this request and DER subsequently ob-
tained an injunction requiring the utility to comply, not only with the particulate
emission standards, but also with new sulfur dioxide regulations that had been put
into effect while the utility was negotiating with the Department of Health. The util-
ity filed a plan to comply with the original particulate emissions order but not with
the sulfur dioxide standards. DER immediately initiated a contempt proceeding
against officials of the utility. The defendant contended that because the only sulfur
dioxide removal equipment available was the wrong size, was designed to be used with
fuel that defendant could not obtain, had been shown to be ineffective, was still in
the experimental stages, and produced a residue that would have to be discharged into
Commonwealth waters, compliance with the sulfur dioxide regulations was techni-
cally impossible. The commonwealth court dismissed DER's complaint holding that
the utility had adequately shown that compliance was impossible and that DER had
not rebutted this showing with expert opinion testimony. The court noted that the
utility's expenditure of $92 million to develop sulfur dioxide control devices indicated
the defendant's good faith in attempting to solve the problem. The court also held
that, in dismissing the complaint, it was not substituting its own judgment on environ-
mental standards for that of the agency, but was merely ruling on whether defendant
should be held in contempt for violating a court order.
201. DER v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 212, 224-25,
316 A.2d 96, 103 (1974).
202. In In re Price's Poultry, Inc., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 227 (EHB 1972), a showing
of good faith effort to comply resulted in a reduction in the penalties imposed for
violation of an environmental statute. See also Commonwealth v. United States
Steel Corp., 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184, 325 A.2d 324 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Frailey Tp., 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 258 (EHB 1973) (municipality's appeal, on grounds
of financial inability, from a DER order that it build a sewage system was dismissed
when the municipality made no bona fide effort to obtain financing).
203. 427 Pa. 540, 234 A.2d 852 (1967).
204. 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 601, 327 A.2d 647 (1974).
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proceedings remains intact, there are signs that courts and DER are
becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of considering the eco-
nomic impact of agency environmental orders and enforcement ac-
tions.
In Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co.2"5 the supreme court
ruled that a coal company could be required under the Clean
Streams Law to treat mine water that seeped into its mine from
a neighboring, abandoned mine. While rejecting the coal company's
contention that this ruling would impose undue economic hardship
on the company, the court distinguished between a regulation that
would make coal mining infeasible and one that merely would make
it more expensive. The court found that the questioned regulation
fit within the latter category since the coal company planned to con-
tinue its operations regardless of the outcome of the case. The dis-
tincton implies, however, that the court would have reached a dif-
ferent result if the regulation would have driven the company
out of business. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.2 °6 strength-
ened the implication by stressing that any relief granted the Com-
monwealth would have to be reasonable and not oppressive. These
cases do little more than slightly open the door, however, for con-
sideration of the economic impact of environmental regulations by
the courts.
The first definitive breakthrough in this area occurred in
Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. DER.2"7 Several dredging
companies applied to DER for a permit to dredge a river bed for
gravel. DER granted the permit, but attached numerous conditions
thereto, including prohibitions against dredging within fifty feet of
any shoreline, against dredging on weekends and holidays, and against
dredging in any natural and untouched areas. The companies ap-
pealed to EHB, contending that the conditions were unreason-
able and that the limitations on the areas to be dredged were so
restrictive that they would be forced out of business. In an exhaus-
tive opinion 08 EHB ruled that although DER may lawfully attach
conditions to dredging permits, it must consider the economic
impact of those conditions, particularly as they relate to the timing
of the imposition of dredging area limitations. EHB found ample
299
205. 452 Pa. 77,306A.2d 308 (1973).
206. 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974).
207. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,341 A.2d 556 (1975).
208. 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 679 (EHB 1973).
evidence that the area limitations would have an adverse economic
impact on the dredging companies, their employees, their customers
(especially PennDot), and the communities in which the employees
lived. Consequently, EHB held that it was error for DER to ignore
the economic impact of its action on both the dredging companies
and the general public. EHB then ordered DER to balance the ad-
verse economic impact of the permit conditions against the harmful
environmental effect that would occur if certain permit conditions
were dropped or postponed. Subsequently the commonwealth court
affirmed the EHB order in its entirety. The court ruled that it was
quite proper for EHB to require DER to balance the environmental
impact of dredging against the economic impact of the terms and
conditions attached to the permit" 9 and admonished the agency for
its failure to establish regulations to guide companies who have in-
vested millions of dollars in dredging operations over a period of
years.21 0 Thus, it is now established that DER must consider eco-
nomic factors when severe adverse economic consequences may re-
sult from the agency action.21'
Besides the indications that the courts and DER are beginning
to consider economic and technical infeasibility, exceptions have been
carved from the rule that infeasibility is not a defense in an injunc-
tion action. For example, in Commonwealth v. Wyeth Laboratories2'
defendant purchased land that previously had been used as a city
dump. Because of that former use and the condition of the land it-
self, pollutants percolated into a stream that flowed through the
property. Wyeth made repeated, but futile efforts to abate the pollu-
tion of the stream by encasing it in concrete conduits. Eventually
DER sought an injunction. The lower court ordered both parties
to submit feasible abatement plans, ruling that failure to submit
these plans would result in a dismissal. The court held that no in-
junction would issue if DER did not formulate a reasonable and
feasible plan for Wyeth to apply. The commonwealth court affirmed,
holding that when, as here, defendant is not affirmatively polluting,
209. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at -, 341 A.2d at 566.
210. Id. at-, 341 A.2d at 566.
211. A similar conclusion results from a close reading of the commonwealth
court's opinion in Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 2 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971), af 'd sub nom. Bortz Coal Co. v. DER, 7 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 362, 299 A.2d 670 (1973). In that case the court held that the re-
fusal of a Commission hearing examiner in an air pollution abatement proceeding
to permit testimony on economic factors was error when the Commission had the
power to set time limits within which compliance with abatement orders might be
accomplished. Although the holding has limited value as a precedent because of the
statutory mandate that air resources be protected in a manner consistent with a policy
of attracting and expanding industry, the case nevertheless stands for the proposition
that, in extreme cases, the enforcement agency must consider the impact of its ac-
tions.
212. 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 227, 315 A.2d 648 (1974).
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has not aggravated the situation by its conduct, and is responsible
only because of its ownership of the polluting property, impossibility
is a defense to an injunction. Once the impossibility defense is raised,
the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove that reasonable and
feasible abatement methods are available.21 3 The exception estab-
lished here, though limited in scope, is another step in the direc-
tion of establishing impossibility as a full-fledged defense to environ-
mental regulations.
Also, the recent practice of some courts to take a case under
advisement, rather than immediately issue an injunction when the
question of impossibility has been raised, indicates a growing willing-
ness of these courts to consider impossibility as a full defense. The
commonwealth court approved this approach when employed by the
lower court in Wyeth Laboratories, observing that conflicting expert
opinions, conflicting evaluations of the feasibility of abatement
methods, and evidence that additional abatement methods remained
unexplored constituted sufficient reasons for the lower court to re-
tain jurisdiction while the parties attempted to resolve the impossi-
bility problems. The commonwealth court reaffirmed its approval
of this practice in Commonwealth v. United States Steel Corp.
2 14
213. For a general discussion of the burden of proof in establishing infeasibil-
ity, see Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). For a discussion of burden of proof in Pennsylvania
environmental cases see Commonwealth v. United States Steel Corp., 15 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 184, 325 A.2d 324 (1974), in which the court states that when de-
fendant takes an appeal from an original DER order (for example, an appeal of that
order to EHB or to commonwealth court) on the grounds of impossibility, the burden
is on DER to prove the feasibility of compliance with the order. When, however,
DER seeks an injunction or a contempt decree to enforce compliance with an order
from which the defendant has not appealed, the burden is on the defendant to prove
impossibility if such a defense is allowed. Consequently, it is tactically advantageous
for defendants to appeal DER orders and open the impossibility question therein.
214. 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 184, 325 A.2d 324 (1974). In this case DER
and the local air pollution commission of Allegheny County entered a consent decree
with defendant concerning a plan to cut air pollution caused by the Clairton coke
works. Subsequently, defendant violated the emissions standards that it had agreed
to in the consent decree and DER sought to have the company held in contempt for
such violation. After the defendant argued that the standards set by the consent de-
cree were infeasible, the trial court, apparently realizing that severe contempt sanc-
tions might cause the company to shut down the Clairton works and put over 7000
employees out of work, took the case under advisement and ordered the parties to
attempt to find feasible abatement methods. The commonwealth court reversed and
held that a court did not have the power to so modify the terms of a consent decree
without the consent of both parties. At the same time, however, the court praised
the lower court's attempt to establish a procedure whereby perplexing technical prob-
lems could be resolved by experts working together under judicial surveillance. The
court stated that, in a proper case, such an approach would be prudent.
It is significant that in Warren Sand & Gravel EHB required
DER to consider not only the immediate economic effect that the
agency's regulations would have on the dredging companies, but also
the effect that DER's actions would have on the general public. 215
Ultimately the public pays increased prices to offset the cost of a
manufacturer's pollution control program and the public suffers from
the loss of products or services no longer available because a com-
pany has been forced to close its doors.2 16 Although the public may
generally be willing to bear pollution abatement costs, considerations
such as the current recession and energy crisis dictate that courts
take a more rational approach to enforcement of environmental con-
trol laws and regulations when impossibility or a significant adverse
economic impact is involved.217
A reasonable judicial approach would permit a defendant to
raise the defense of impossibility any time an environmental agency
seeks to enforce its orders or regulations in the courts. As a mini-
mum the impossibility defense should be permitted whenever evi-
dence exists that defendant will be driven out of business if the agency
order is fully enforced. In all cases the court should consider any
evidence of the economic impact that would result from enforcement
of the environmental order. In addition, more cases should be taken
under advisement while the parties attempt, under judicial scrutiny,
to reach solutions among themselves. This last practice will be
especially useful when impossibility of compliance or a significant
Note that the practice of taking a case under advisement while the defendant
is given time to work out a sensible pollution abatement method has not been limited
to situations involving large and economically important industries whose loss or even
temporary shut-down would have a serious economic impact on the state. In Com-
monwealth v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 27 Som. 18 (Pa. C.P. 1971), the court took
a similar approach with respect to a ski resort that had been ordered to discontinue
the discharge of inadequately treated sewage from its motel and lodge facilities.
215. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 341 A.2d 556 (1975).
216. Pollution control measures may also substantially increase the taxes of
those who can least afford it. In Commonwealth v. Frailey Tp., 62 Pa. D. & C.2d
258 (EHB 1973), the EHB rejected a township's contention that it could not afford
to enter into a sewage treatment plan with a neighboring municipality. The township
was an economically depressed area with 158 of 354 residents relying on social secur-
ity or welfare for their support. There were only 133 wage earners in the township,
none of whom earned more than $5000 annually. The township's financial inability
arguments were rejected because it had made no efforts to find outside financial aid.
In In re Community of Gray, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 559 (EHB 1973), similar economic
problems existed and similar arguments as to the inability of local taxpayers to bear
the cost of a sewage treatment plant were rejected.
217. The federal courts are acutely aware of the necessity to consider the eco-
nomic impact of national environmental decisions. In International Harvester Co.
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court reversed an EPA denial
of a petition by the automakers for a one-year extension of time to meet the 1975
light vehicle emission standards. In remanding the case to the EPA, the court
ordered the agency to balance the impact that a denial of the extension or a last min-
ute suspension of the deadline would have on jobs and the national economy against
the adverse environmental results of a timely suspension of the emission deadline.
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adverse economic impact has been shown. Finally, while recent cases
indicate a movement toward the approach outlined above, these
cases for the most part have involved only large and critical
industries such as coal, steel, and electric power production.2 18 Im-
possibility of compliance, however, is not a problem unique to these
industries. The impossibility and adverse economic impact defenses
also should be available to small parties. Although the adverse eco-
nomic impact resulting from enforcement of environmental orders
against a large, important industry will be greater than when a similar
enforcement order against a small company is involved, a detrimental
effect on the state economy will result in both instances. In fact,
the local hardship caused by the closing of a small town's sole in-
dustry may be far worse than the statewide impact of an increase in
prices by a large industry trying to pay its pollution abatement bills.
V. Conclusion
Defenses based on attacks on the statutes under which DER and
other environmental agencies act have been largely unsuccessful.
One important reason is the presumption that these statutes are both
constitutional and reasonable. Environmental litigants generally
have been unable to overcome this presumption and the likelihood
that they will be able to do so in the future is small because the
desire of the public and legislature to restore and protect the envi-
ronment normally is respected by the courts.
Attacks on DER actions have met with greater success. Al-
though there is a presumption that administrative agencies act cor-
rectly and in accordance with the law, the limits of DER's authority
are not always clear and are just now being defined. The same is
true in determining what constitutes reasonable conduct by the agency.
While the viability of defenses in this category depends on the speci-
fic facts of each case, it is clear that the agency cannot act beyond
the powers conferred upon it by the legislature nor can it act in an
arbitrary and capricious manner or issue orders unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence.
Finally, there are signs that the defense of technical and eco-
nomic infeasibility, traditionally valid only in a contempt proceeding,
may be gaining acceptance for use in any court proceeding to enforce
environmental orders or regulations. Reason, as well as the current
218. See notes 200-14 and accompanying text supra.
energy and economic crises, may compel courts to allow defendants
faced with a technically or economically impossible task of comply-
ing with an environmental agency order the opportunity to present
the only real defense that can save their businesses. Rational appli-
cation of this defense will preserve the Commonwealth's environment
and its economy.
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